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1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite its call for removing the existing 
obstacles to ensure the effectiveness of the EU 
right to compensation (‘full compensation’ for 
any natural or legal person),3 Directive N° 
2014/104/EU provides for a systemic 
protection from disclosure of leniency 
corporate statements and settlement 
submissions. They are blacklisted, so to speak. 
Indeed, Article 6(6) sets out that “Member States 
shall ensure that, for the purpose of actions for damages, 
national courts cannot at any time order a party or a 
third party to disclose any of the following categories of 
evidence: (a) leniency statements; and (b) settlement 
submissions.”  
While the scope of this provision is relatively 
limited, recital No 26 amplifies it: “exemption 
should also apply to verbatim quotations from leniency 
                                                 
1 Professor at the University of Macerata. 
2 Article based on the speech given at the conference: 
“The Interplay between Public e Private Enforcement in the Light 
of Directive 2014/104/UE”, Rome, 28 May 2015. 
3 See recital n° 13 of Directive 2014/104/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of 
the European Union, Official Journal 5.12.2014 L 349/1. 
statements or settlement submissions included in other 
documents”. Yet recitals are not meant to have a 
normative role.4 As a result, Member States 
should not be required to implement the 
blacklist accordingly. Recital No 26 is 
nonetheless an interpretative means of Article 
6(6) capable of enlarging its scope to the extent 
that national authorities implement or apply it.  
The overall impression is that the Directive 
enhances the attractiveness of early applications 
under leniency regimes even in terms of 
limiting the liability of the recipient of 
immunity for the harm it caused. This might 
ultimately accentuate the divide between cartel 
members and whistle-blowers. It seems that the 
Directive’s rationale is to protect the vital role 
of public authorities in antitrust infringements, 
with private enforcement being a 
complementary means.5 In that perspective, 
preventing the disclosure of leniency 
statements or settlement submissions – while 
offering a tool to enlarge its scope in 
interpretative terms – is a consequential 
legislative choice. It is assumed that such a 
disclosure would have a detrimental effect on 
                                                 
4 R. Baratta, ‘Complexity of EU Law in the Domestic 
Implementing Process’, Theory and Practice of Legislation, 
(3)2014, pp. 293-302, and namely the case law cited 
thereof. 
5 G. Muscolo, ‘L’accesso alla prova e lo standard 
probatorio’, passim. 
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entities cooperating under the leniency and 
settlement programs.  
2. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
APPROACH 
The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has 
pursued a different approach in terms of the 
interaction between public and private 
enforcement of competition law. In Pfleiderer, 
the Grand Chamber emphasised both the 
interests of protecting effective public 
enforcement of EU competition rules, on the 
one hand, and of guaranteeing the effective 
exercise of the right to full compensation for 
damages, on the other hand: in considering the 
application for access to documents relating to 
a leniency programme in order to obtain 
damages from another person who has been 
granted leniency, the national courts must 
weigh up the respective interests in favour of 
disclosure of the information and in favour of 
the protection of those documents ‘only on a 
case-by-case basis … and taking into account 
all the relevant factors in the case’.6 
The same holds true for Donau Chemie.7 In this 
case, under an Austrian provision, access to 
documents was possible only if none of the 
parties to the proceedings objected to it. Thus, 
national judges could not take into account the 
fact that ‘access may be the only opportunity 
                                                 
6 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, ECR 
2011, I-5161, paras. 30-31. 
7 Case 536/11, Donau Chemie, ECR 2013, 366. 
those persons have to obtain the evidence 
needed on which to base their claim for 
compensation’; as the ECJ underscored, that 
provision “is liable to make the exercise of the right to 
compensation which those persons derive from European 
Union law excessively difficult”.8 Certainly, rules on 
file access should not be applied to undermine 
public interests, such as the effectiveness of 
anti-infringement policies in the area of 
competition law, since leniency programmes 
are useful tools if efforts to uncover and bring 
an end to infringements of competition rules 
are to be effective for ensuring the success of 
efforts to uncover and bring to an end 
infringements of competition rules, thus 
guaranteeing the enforcement of Articles 
101 TFEU and 102 TFEU.9 However, access 
may not be systematically refused: any request for 
access ‘must be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis, taking into account all the relevant 
factors in the case’: it is for the national courts 
‘to appraise, firstly, the interest of the 
requesting party in obtaining access to those 
documents in order to prepare its action for 
damages, in particular in the light of other 
possibilities it may have’;10 and secondly ‘to 
take into consideration the actual harmful 
consequences which may result from such 
access having regard to public interests or the 
legitimate interests of other parties’.11 The ECJ 
finally stressed that a non-disclosure provision 
“is liable to prevent those actions from being brought, by 
                                                 
8 Ivi, para. 39. 
9 Ivi, paras. 41 and 42. 
10 Ivi, para. 44. 
11 Ivi, para. 45. 
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giving the undertakings concerned, who may have 
already benefited from immunity, at the very least 
partial, from pecuniary penalties, an opportunity also to 
circumvent their obligation to compensate for the harm 
resulting from the infringement of Article 101 TFEU, 
to the detriment of the injured parties, requires that 
refusal to be based on overriding reasons relating to the 
protection of the interest relied on and applicable to each 
document to which access is refused. It is only if there is 
a risk that a given document may actually undermine 
the public interest relating to the effectiveness of the 
national leniency programme that non-disclosure of that 
document may be justified”.12 
It seems reasonable to conclude that the ECJ 
aimed to counterbalance the so-called 
information asymmetry, which is a 
distinguishing feature of competition law 
litigation: the evidence necessary to prove a 
claim for damages is usually held by the 
opposing party or by third parties.13 That is 
why it is often considered appropriate to 
ensure that the claimant is, in principle, granted 
the right to obtain the disclosure of evidence 
relevant to their claim. 
                                                 
12 Ivi, paras. 48-49. 
13 See C.A. Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the 
EU, UK and USA, OUP, Oxford, 1999, p. 248: this 
author points out that the greatest practical challenge to 
private antitrust litigation in Europe is the difficulties of 
gathering evidence. 
3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
DIRECTIVE’S PROVISIONS AND THE 
RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE 
One may expect that the principles held in 
Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie are to be applied 
even to the EU legislator. Admittedly, in both 
cases the ECJ incidenter tantum noted that EU 
law does not lay down common rules as 
regards the right of access to documents 
relating to a leniency procedure, which have 
been voluntarily submitted to a national 
competition authority pursuant to a national 
leniency programme.14 Is it possible to argue 
that the Article 6(6) of the Directive, while 
assuming that the role of deterrence of antitrust 
infringements remains with public authorities, 
is somehow grounded on that obiter dictum so 
that it fills a gap left open by the ECJ? An in-
depth analysis of the ECJ case law as a whole 
might suggest a more nuanced conclusion. 
It is worth recalling that, according to the 
ECJ’s settled case law, every individual enjoys 
the right to claim damages for losses caused to 
him by conduct that is liable to restrict or 
distort competition.15 The ECJ’s approach may 
be interpreted in the sense that the right to full 
compensation is guaranteed by the Treaty, it 
being an inherent part of the acquis. Indeed, the 
Court has held that actions for damages before 
national courts can make a significant 
                                                 
14 See cases Pfleiderer, cit., supra fn. 4, para. 20, and Donau 
Chemie, cit. supra, fn. 5, para. 25. 
15 See case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan ECR 2001, 
I-6297, paragraphs 24 and 26, and joined cases C-295/04 
to C-298/04 Manfredi and Others ECR 2006, I-6619, 
paragraphs 59 and 61. 
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contribution to the maintenance of effective 
competition in the European Union.16 
Additionally, the ECJ pointed out that the 
existence of such a right strengthens the 
efficacy of the EU competition rules and 
discourages agreements or practices, frequently 
covert, which are liable to restrict or distort 
competition. It is worth recalling that one of 
the main obstacles to a more effective system 
of antitrust damages actions relates to 
obtaining the evidence needed to prove a 
case.17 In Courage and Crehan, the ECJ clearly 
stated that “there should not be any absolute bar” to 
action for damages ‘being brought’ by a party 
claiming compensation for violation of 
competition rules.18 Pfleiderer (and subsequently 
Donau Chemie) complemented this 
jurisprudence. As pointed out above, it 
weighed the respective interests in favour of 
disclosure of the information, i.e. the right to 
full compensation, against the ones in favour of 
the protection of that information provided 
voluntarily by the applicant for leniency, i.e. the 
interest of protecting effective public 
enforcement, only on a case-by-case basis, while 
taking into account all the relevant factors in the case. 
It is noteworthy that the ECJ did so in Pfleiderer 
despite the fact that General Advocate Mazak 
seemed to suggest quite a different solution, 
according to which ‘access to voluntary self-
                                                 
16 Courage and Crehan, cit., para. 27. 
17 Cf. Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the 
EC antitrust rules (COM(2005) 672 final. 
18 Courage and Crehan, cit., supra fn. 13, para. 28. 
incriminating statements made by leniency 
applicant should not, in principle, be granted’.19 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
As regards the black list – although restrictively 
implemented – the problem is whether it fits 
the underlying EU principles reflected in the 
ECJ case law whenever such a prohibition is 
liable to permit the whistle blower to 
circumvent its obligation to compensate for the 
harm resulting from the infringement, to the 
detriment of the injured parties, without 
considering if there is in the specific case a real risk 
of actually undermining the public interest 
relating to the effectiveness of the national 
leniency programme. Indeed, according to the 
ECJ, only if there are overriding reasons that 
disclosure adversely affects the public interest 
relating to the effectiveness of the leniency 
programme can the non-disclosure of a given 
document be justified.  
Unless the black list leaves enough room for 
accessing information voluntarily disclosed by 
the applicant for leniency, a potential collision 
with the ECJ case law might arise. Put 
differently, insofar as injured parties do not 
retain sufficient alternative means by which to 
obtain access to the relevant evidence they 
need in order to lodge an action for damages, 
such as for instance ‘pre-existing information’, 
the exemption laid down in Article 6(6) may 
amount to a legal immunity from liability and 
                                                 
19 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG, cit. supra fn. 4, para. 46. 
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ultimately from any form of judiciary control. 
In this situation, one may question the 
coherence of the provision with the right to 
compensation, which derives directly from the 
Treaty. This right should be effective. Having 
no access to evidence can mean that victims of 
a competition law infringement, who are 
seeking compensation for harm suffered, are 
prevented from bringing actions before 
national judges. The right to compensation 
appears far from being effective in that 
situation. 
In other words, Article 6(6) of the Directive 
raises an issue in terms of the right to access to 
justice if it is, in specific situations, tantamount 
to making a judicial action practically 
impossible or fair compensation excessively 
difficult to achieve. What if, in a concrete 
situation, this absolute protection for those two 
types of documents, which is definitely biased 
in favour of the public interest, negates the 
individual’s legitimate claim for compensation? 
What if, in other words, access to all other 
documents in the course of an antitrust 
procedure does not suffice for the victims to 
establish, for the purposes of a private action 
for damages, the existence of an illegal act in 
breach of competition law, the damage caused 
to those victims or the casual link between the 
damage and the breach? Would that normative 
solution not run counter to the fundamental 
right to an effective remedy? An absolute 
privilege may cause harm to the rights of 
persons who claim compensation but have no 
others means to obtain the related evidence. 
Preventing disclosure under any circumstances 
may, in some specific cases, entail a sort of 
immunity from judicial control over 
competition infringements, affecting access to 
justice, which is an integral part of the rule of 
law principle on which the Union is founded 
(Article 2 TEU).  
This is not to say that some protection of 
documents relating to leniency statements and 
settlements submissions is not an important 
tool for ensuring the proper functioning of the 
public enforcement of competition rules. It is a 
legitimate objective being pursued by the EU 
legal order. The problem is whether an 
absolute denial of disclosure is proportionate; 
or in other words, whether this strong 
protection from disclosure does not restrict or 
reduce the access to justice for individuals in 
such a way or to such an extent that the very 
essence of the same right is impaired. The right 
to effective judicial protection is laid down in 
the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and in the 
first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as 
well as under Article 6 of the ECHR. Access to 
justice, as a fundamental right of the EU legal 
order, as well as of the ECHR, should not be 
theoretical or illusory, but practical and 
effective, as is routinely underscored. 
Therefore, it is questionable whether the 
Directive’s approach would stand up to 
challenges on the grounds of EU fundamental 
rights, whenever parties to litigation are 
prevented from obtaining documents which are 
critical to their capacity to bring a case and 
which they would, absent the Directive, 
otherwise have been entitled to pursue under 
domestic law. 
To conclude, I personally would have felt more 
comfortable with a more nuanced normative 
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solution still based on the protection of public 
interests, but within a legal framework 
providing for either a judicial decision taken on 
a case by case basis and grounded on a 
balancing of different interests in the concrete 
situation, as the ECJ has suggested in its settled 
case law; or offering alternative means, such as for 
instance instructing experts to produce 
summaries of the protected information or 
perhaps reversing the burden of proof against 
the defendants profiting from a black-list, in 
order to effectively protect the legitimate rights 
of individuals claiming damages for loss caused 
to them by conduct liable to restrict or distort 
EU competition rules. 
 
 
 
 
 
